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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
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 The owners of a coal-fired power plant failed both 
to obtain a preconstruction permit and to install certain 
pollution-control technology before making changes to 
the plant.  The Environmental Protection Agency and 
several states say the owners were required to do so.  But 
the EPA
1
 did not cry foul until more than a decade after 
the changes, well after the owners had sold the plant.  
Now the EPA wants to force the former owners to obtain 
the missing preconstruction permit and to install the 
missing pollution controls on a plant they no longer own 
or operate.  And they seek damages and an injunction 
against the current owners who neither owned nor 
operated the plant when it was allegedly modified 
illegally.  The relief now sought would require us to 
distort plain statutory text to shore up what the EPA 
views as an incomplete remedial scheme.  That we 
cannot do, and so we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of their claims. 
                                                 
1
 For readability, “the EPA” refers to both the EPA and 
the states unless otherwise specified. 
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I. 
A. The Homer City Generation Power Plant goes 
online in 1969, and Congress enacts the Clean 
Air Act. 
In the 1960s, the Pennsylvania Electric Company 
(Penelec) and the New York State Electric & Gas 
Corporation (NYSEG) built the Homer City Generating 
Station (“the Plant”), a coal-burning power plant in 
Indiana County, Pennsylvania.  JA66.  The Plant’s first 
two burners went online at the end of the decade.  Id.  At 
that time, the Clean Air Act was little more than a 
federally funded research program on air pollution, the 
EPA did not exist, and the few enforceable standards in 
place did not affect the Plant’s construction and 
operation.  See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
148, 81 Stat. 485–507 (expanding studies into air 
pollutants, emissions, and control techniques); Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 
954–55; Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 
Stat. 392–401; Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. 
No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (providing funds for federal 
research into air pollution). 
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B. Congress enacts the Clean Air Act, which 
grandfathers pre-existing pollution sources (like 
the Plant) out of its requirements until they are 
“modified.” 
1. The Clean Air Act of 1970 sets up the 
modern federalism-based framework. 
While the Plant ramped up operations over the 
next two decades, Congress enacted three amendments to 
the Clean Air Act transforming it into the comprehensive 
regulatory scheme it is today. It is necessary, then, to take 
a minor detour through those legislative changes.   
These amendments reach back to 1970 when 
Congress converted the Act from a federal research 
program on air pollution into the federalist enforcement 
framework still in place today.  Clean Air Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-604.  The 1970 version charged the soon-
to-be
2
 EPA with setting national maximum permissible 
levels of common pollutants for any given area—called 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, or NAAQS 
(pronounced “knacks”).  See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)–(b) 
                                                 
2
 President Nixon did not create the EPA until later in 
1970 after Congress declared a national environmental 
policy.  See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347.  Before the EPA, federal 
environmental responsibilities were decentralized among 
various executive agencies. 
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(requiring the EPA to choose levels that “allow[] an 
adequate margin of safety” required “to protect the public 
health” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).  The EPA 
designates “nonattainment” areas within each state where 
a regulated pollutant levels exceeds the NAAQS (so 
called because the areas are not attaining the EPA’s 
standards).  42 U.S.C. § 7407(d). 
The states then take primary responsibility (if they 
want it
3
) for choosing how to meet the NAAQS within 
their borders.  See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63–67 (1975).  They do so by creating 
State Implementation Plans, or SIPs.  In their SIPs, states 
“choose which individual sources within [their borders] 
must reduce emissions, and by how much.”  EME Homer 
City Generation L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 13 (D.C. Cir. 
2012).  For instance, a state “may decide to impose 
different emissions limits on individual coal-burning 
power plants, natural gas-burning power plants, and other 
sources of air pollution, such as factories, refineries, 
incinerators, and agricultural activities.”  Id.  A state 
must submit its SIP to the EPA for review and approval 
whenever the NAAQS are updated, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a)(1), and each SIP must meet certain 
requirements, see id. §§ 7410(a)(2), 7471. 
                                                 
3
 If a state refuses to participate, the EPA takes over and 
regulates pollution sources directly.  EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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2. The 1977 amendments create the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
(PSD) pre-construction permit program. 
The 1970 framework merely prevented pollution 
sources from exceeding the NAAQS.  It did not prevent 
new construction or modifications that would “gray out” 
areas with clean air as long as the pollution did not 
exceed the NAAQS.  See Craig N. Oren, Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus 
Site-Shifting, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 9 (1988).  At least that 
was the consensus before federal courts interpreted the 
Clean Air Act as requiring the EPA to “prevent 
deterioration of [the nation’s] air quality, no matter how 
presently pure that quality in some sections of the 
country happens to be.”  Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 
F. Supp. 253, 255 (D.D.C. 1972), aff’d, 41 U.S.L.W. 
2255 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1972) (per curiam), aff’d by an 
equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 
U.S. 541 (1973) (per curiam) (Powell, J., recused).  To 
enforce that interpretation, Congress created a program 
for reviewing the effect of new pollution sources on 
existing air quality before they are constructed.  Oren, 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 
at 10. 
Congress divided this aptly named New Source 
Review program into two permit programs.  For areas 
with unclean air—called “nonattainment” areas because 
they are not attaining the NAAQS—the Nonattainment 
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New Source Review program ensures that new emissions 
will not significantly hinder the area’s progress towards 
meeting the NAAQS.  For areas with clean air—
“attainment” areas—the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) program ensures that any new 
emissions will not significantly degrade existing air 
quality.
4
  The PSD program stands at the center of this 
case. 
The PSD program requires operators of pollution 
sources in attainment areas to obtain a permit from the 
state or the EPA before constructing or modifying a 
“major emitting facility” (which emits significant air 
pollution even with pollution controls installed).  See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7475(a) (setting permitting requirements), 
7479(1) (defining “major emitting facility”).  This “case-
by-case” permitting process “tak[es] into account energy, 
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs,” 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7479, 7602(k), to 
determine the “best available control technology” 
                                                 
4
 These programs are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
It is possible for the same area to be classified as a 
nonattainment area for some pollutants and as an 
attainment area for others.  See, e.g., United States v. 
DTE Energy Co., 711 F.3d 643, 644 n.1 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that Monroe, Michigan, “falls into both 
categories depending on the pollutant”). 
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(BACT)
5
 for controlling every regulated pollutant at the 
facility to a specified limit, 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
6
  In 
keeping with the Clean Air Act’s federalist framework, 
Congress required states to implement the PSD program 
in their SIPs.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(II), 
(a)(2)(J).   
                                                 
5
 BACT is something of a misnomer. It does not refer to 
any specific technology, but rather to a specified 
emissions limit for each pollutant that reflects which 
pollution-control technology will be used.  See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 52.21(b)(12) (defining BACT as an “emissions 
limitation” based on the “maximum degree of reduction 
for each [regulated] pollutant” that “would be emitted 
from any proposed major stationary source or major 
modification”).   
6
 For comparison, BACT is not the only standard used in 
the Clean Air Act.  In nonattainment areas, sources are 
required to attain the lowest achievable emission rate 
(LAER).  See 42 U.S.C. § 7503; Citizens Against Ruining 
the Environment v. EPA, 535 F.3d 670, 674 n.3 (7th Cir. 
2008).  At least in theory, LAER is a stricter standard 
than BACT.  Whereas BACT factors in a limited cost-
benefit analysis, LAER requires sources to use whatever 
technology achieves the lowest emission rate contained 
in a SIP or possible in practice, regardless of costs.  See 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7501(3), 7503(a)(2).  As a result, 
determining LAER for any particular pollutant does not 
require a case-by-case determination, unlike BACT. 
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3. The 1990 amendments add an operating-
permit program. 
Such was the Clean Air Act until 1990.  That year, 
Congress passed its third and latest round of major 
amendments.  In addition to other practical problems that 
arose after the 1977 amendments, citizens, regulators, 
and even the owners and operators of pollution sources 
had difficulty knowing which of the Clean Air Act’s 
many requirements applied to a particular pollution 
source.  Sierra Club v. Johnson (Sierra Club 11th Cir.), 
541 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2008); Hon. Henry A. 
Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990, 21 Envtl. L. 1721, 1747 (1991).  After all, the 
only requirements easily discoverable were those 
expressly listed in the preconstruction permits issued 
under the New Source Review program; any other 
applicable requirements under the Clean Air Act were 
scattered among separate records, permits, and other 
documents, if they were recorded at all.  Sierra Club 11th 
Cir., 541 F.3d at 1261; Waxman, An Overview of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 Envtl. L. at 1747. 
Congress fixed that problem by enacting Title V.  
See Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,351 
(explaining that Title V’s goals are “[i]ncreased source 
accountability and better enforcement”).  Title V 
“requires all major sources of air pollution to obtain 
operating permits” that “‘consolidate into a single 
document (the operating permit) all of the clean air 
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requirements applicable to a particular source of air 
pollution.’”  Sierra Club 11th Cir., 541 F.3d at 1260 
(quoting Sierra Club v. Ga. Power Co., 443 F.3d 1346, 
1348–49 (11th Cir. 2006)); see Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 
501–02, 104 Stat. 2399, 2635–36 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7661a(a)).    Title V “does not generally impose new 
substantive air quality control requirements,” Sierra Club 
11th Cir., 541 F.3d at 1260, but does require the source 
to obtain an operating permit that “assures compliance 
. . . with all applicable requirements,” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 70.1(b).  Among the many requirements included in an 
operating permit are PSD emission limits (if applicable).  
Sierra Club 11th Cir., 541 F.3d at 1260.  As with the 
PSD program, Title V’s operating permit program 
became a required element of SIPs.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7661a. 
C. Penelec and NYSEG modify the Plant during 
the 1990s but do not apply for a PSD permit, 
though they later apply for a Title V permit. 
 None of these comprehensive reforms initially 
affected the operation of the Homer City Generation 
Power Plant by Penelec and NYSEG.  Congress had 
grandfathered pre-existing pollution sources, including 
the Plant, out of the PSD requirements “until those 
sources [we]re modified in a way that increases 
pollution.”  Sierra Club 11th Cir., 541 F.3d at 1261; see 
also United States v. Cinergy Corp., 458 F.3d 705, 709 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
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 But the Plant’s sidelined status came to a halt in 
the 1990s.  In 1991, 1994, 1995, and 1996, Penelec and 
NYSEG allegedly made various changes to the Plant’s 
boilers that increased net emissions of sulfur dioxide and 
particulate matter.
7
  Those changes were allegedly 
“major modifications” triggering the PSD permitting 
requirements and requiring the use of BACT.  JA66-67, 
81-82, 84-85.  But at the time, Penelec and NYSEG 
believed their changes were “routine maintenance” 
exempted from the PSD program.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 36:5–
11; see 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(1) (“The following shall not, 
by themselves, be considered modifications under this 
part: (1) Maintenance, repair, and replacement which the 
Administrator determines to be routine for a source 
category . . .”).  So they did not apply for a PSD permit 
and instead continued to operate the modified Plant as 
though it were still exempt from the PSD program and 
BACT-based emissions controls.  In 1995, Penelec and 
NYSEG applied for an operating permit as required by 
Title V.  Because they never received a PSD pre-
modification permit containing BACT-based emissions 
limits for the Plant their Title V operating permit 
application did not include any PSD-based requirements 
or BACT-based emissions limits.  JA83–84, 86–87. 
                                                 
7
 These modifications included replacing economizers, 
modifying ductwork, and installing new reheat 
temperature-control dampers and internal boiler supports.  
JA66–67, 81–82, 84–85. 
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D. EPA announces an “unprecedented” initiative 
to enforce the Clean Air Act.  Meanwhile, the 
Former Owners sell the Plant to the Current 
Owners, after which Pennsylvania approves the 
Plant’s Title V permit. 
While Penelec and NYSEG waited for 
Pennsylvania and the EPA to issue its Title V operating 
permit, the EPA rolled out a new enforcement initiative 
that eventually ensnared the Plant’s operations.  In 1999, 
the EPA “jointly announced what they called an 
‘unprecedented action’”—civil enforcement actions 
against seven electric utility companies and the 
Tennessee Valley Authority for Clean Air Act violations 
dating back more than twenty years at thirty-two power 
plants across ten states.  Margaret Claiborne Campbell & 
Angela Jean Levin, Ten Years of New Source Review 
Enforcement Litigation, 24 Nat. Resources & Env’t 16 
(2010).  That action was merely the first in what would 
become “the largest, most contentious industry-wide 
enforcement initiative in EPA history” to retroactively 
target violations of the New Source Review program: 
[A]ll involve virtually identical allegations.  
In each case, EPA alleges that the 
replacement of parts, typically boiler 
components or portions or components, at 
existing electric generating units amounted 
to “major modifications” of those units, 
triggering new source permitting and 
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regulatory requirements. According to EPA, 
failure to obtain preconstruction permits 
constitutes a continuing violation, rendering 
ongoing operation of the units unlawful. 
Id. 
The same year as the EPA’s announcement, 
Penelec and NYSEG sold the Plant to EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P.  Two years later, EME Homer City 
needed to raise capital, so it entered a sale-leaseback 
transaction with Homer City Owner-Lessors 1 through 8 
(“Homer City OLs”): EME Homer City sold the Plant to 
the Homer City OLs, who simultaneously leased it back 
to EME Homer City.  As a result, Penelec and NYSEG 
became the former owners and operators (“Former 
Owners”), and EME Homer City and the Homer City 
OLs became the current owners and operators (“Current 
Owners”).  Despite these transfers, no one sought a PSD 
permit or installed BACT. 
In 2004, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection finally approved the Title V 
permit application (for which the Former Owners had 
applied nine years earlier) and issued the Title V permit 
to the Current Owners.  JA80.  Because there was no 
PSD permit, the issued Title V permit did not include any 
PSD requirements or BACT requirements. 
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E. In 2011, as part of that initiative, the EPA and 
the States sue the Former and Current Owners. 
 By 2004, the Plant had become “one of the largest 
air pollution sources in the nation,” annually releasing 
nearly 100,000 tons of sulfur dioxide, which 
“contribut[es] to premature mortality, asthma attacks, 
acid rain, and other adverse effects in downwind 
communities and natural areas.”  JA67.  With its 
pollution catching the EPA’s attention, the Plant became 
a target of the agency’s new enforcement initiative.  
 In 2008, the EPA notified the Current and Former 
Owners of their alleged violations (as required by the 
Clean Air Act) before eventually suing them in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania in January 2011.
8
  
According to the EPA, the Former Owners had violated 
(1) the PSD program by modifying the Plant without a 
PSD permit and without installing BACT-based 
emissions controls before modifying the Plant and (2) 
Title V by submitting an incomplete operating-permit 
                                                 
8
 This three-year gap between the notice of violations and 
the lawsuit is not abnormal.  The notice-of-violation 
requirement, tracking the federalism-based structure of 
the rest of the Clean Air Act, affords states the 
opportunity to take the lead in enforcement by giving the 
alleged violators an opportunity to negotiate a solution to 
the violations with their states.  The EPA’s enforcement 
authority is a backstop. 
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application that omitted the Plant’s modifications and 
proposed BACT controls.  The Current Owners, on the 
other hand, had allegedly violated (1) the PSD program 
by operating the Plant after it had been modified without 
BACT controls installed or a PSD permit and (2) Title V 
by operating in accordance with their facially valid but 
inadequate operating permit (inadequate because it failed 
to include any of the applicable PSD permit requirements 
or require the use of BACT).  JA81–83, 84–86.  The EPA 
sought injunctive relief against the Former and Current 
Owners as well as civil penalties against the Current 
Owners for their past five years of operation.  JA88–89.9   
 That was only the beginning.  New York, New 
Jersey, and the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection filed motions to intervene as 
plaintiffs, which the District Court granted.  See JA91–
130, 195–223.  These States alleged the same violations 
                                                 
9
 Because the Clean Air Act does not contain a statute of 
limitations, the general federal five-year statute of 
limitations applies to any claim for civil penalties.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 2462 (establishing a general five-year statute 
of limitations for “an action, suit or proceeding for the 
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, 
pecuniary or otherwise”).  The EPA did not seek civil 
penalties from the Former Owners because the five-year 
statute of limitations for civil penalties had expired.  
JA82–89. 
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as the EPA
10
 and raised state-law claims that concededly 
rise or fall with the federal claims.  
 The Former and Current Owners moved to dismiss 
the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  The District Court 
granted that motion in its entirety and dismissed the 
EPA’s claims in October 2011.  See JA6.  In a nutshell, 
the District Court held that the five-year statute of 
limitations had expired on the civil-penalty PSD claims 
against the Current Owners because the PSD program 
imposes only prerequisites to construction and 
modification, not ongoing conditions of operation.  And 
because the Current Owners were not the ones to modify 
the Plant, they could not be liable for violating the PSD 
requirements and thus injunctive relief was also 
unavailable against them.  The District Court also 
declined to enjoin the Former Owners because they no 
longer owned or operated the Plant and thus posed no 
risk of violating the PSD program in the future.  JA28–
32.   
                                                 
10
 The States’ allegations differed from the EPA’s in only 
one respect: according to the States, the Former Owners 
modified the Plant (and thus triggered the PSD 
requirements) not only in 1991 and 1994 as alleged by 
the EPA, but also in 1995 and 1996.  As all the parties 
agree, this difference is irrelevant to our analysis. 
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 As to the Title V operating permit claims, the 
Current Owners could not be liable because Title V does 
not transform the PSD requirements into operating duties 
and does not permit a collateral attack on a facially valid 
permit.  JA32–36.  Likewise, the Former Owners could 
not be held liable because all that Title V prohibits is 
operating a source out of compliance with the operating 
permit.  The Former Owners never owned or operated the 
Plant after the Title V permit was issued.  JA32. 
 The EPA and States appealed.
11
 
                                                 
11
 Because the EPA’s and States’ PSD claims arise under 
federal law, the District Court had federal-question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  See Landsman & 
Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72, 82 n.8 
(3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that federal-question 
jurisdiction under § 1331 extends only to “cases ‘in 
which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either [1] that 
federal law creates the cause of action or [2] that the 
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on 
resolution of a substantial question of federal law.’” 
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983))).  Given those federal 
anchor claims, the District Court had supplemental 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the state-law 
claims.  Because the District Court’s order dismissing the 
EPA’s and States’ claims was a final order, we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  As we 
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II. 
 The EPA asks us to reverse the District Court’s 
dismissal of its PSD preconstruction-permit claims and 
Title V operating-permit claims against the Former and 
Current Owners.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal in its entirety. 
A. PSD Claims 
1. Against the Current Owners 
 The EPA contends that the Current Owners 
violated the PSD program by operating the Plant while 
failing to use BACT and satisfy the PSD requirements.  
As relief, the EPA seeks $37,500 (the maximum daily 
civil penalty
12
) for each day that the Current Owners 
                                                                                                             
explain in Part II.B, however, the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over the EPA and States’ Title V claims. 
12
 Although the statute sets the maximum civil penalty at 
$25,000 “per day for each violation,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7413(b), Congress has since directed each federal 
agency to regularly adjust for inflation statutory civil 
penalties that can be imposed under laws it administers.  
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 
28 U.S.C. § 2461 note, amended by Debt Collection 
Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. § 3701 note.  
Effective after January 12, 2009, the inflation-adjusted 
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operated the Plant for the five years preceding this 
lawsuit (the statute of limitations for civil penalties).  
They also want a permanent injunction ordering the 
Current Owners to obtain a PSD permit and install 
BACT.   
 The District Court dismissed these claims, 
reasoning that failure to comply with the PSD program is 
a one-time violation that occurs only at the time of 
construction or modification (here, 1996 at the latest).  
Consequently, it concluded that the Current Owners did 
not violate the PSD program because they did not modify 
the Plant; the Former Owners did.
13
  But if, as the EPA 
                                                                                                             
maximum daily civil penalty under the Clean Air Act is 
$37,500.  40 C.F.R. § 19.4. 
13
 The EPA does not argue that the Clean Air Act 
imposes successor liability on the Current Owners for the 
Former Owners’ alleged violation of the PSD Program.  
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (authorizing the EPA to 
enforce the Clean Air Act against a “person that is the 
owner or operator” of a “major emitting facility” only if 
“such person” has committed a violation (emphasis 
added)), with 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (providing a list of 
“persons”—explicitly including current owners or 
operators and any person who owned or operated the 
facility when the hazardous substances were disposed—
who can be held liable under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
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urges, the PSD program imposes operating duties, then a 
new violation occurs each day that the Current Owners 
operated the Plant without BACT or a PSD permit 
(subject, of course, to the five-year statute of limitations).  
The claims against the Current Owners thus rise or fall 
on the answer to a single question: Does the PSD 
program prohibit operating a facility without BACT or a 
PSD permit?   
 We agree with the unanimous view of the other 
courts of appeals that have addressed this question.  The 
PSD program’s plain text requires the answer be “no.” 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a), “[n]o major emitting facility 
. . . may be constructed [or modified
14
] . . . unless” it 
meets various PSD requirements, including obtaining a 
PSD permit and installing BACT-based emission 
controls.  That provision prohibits “construct[ing]” a 
facility without obtaining a PSD permit or using BACT, 
and while “construction” is defined to include 
                                                                                                             
Act (CERCLA) for remediation costs).  Nor does the 
EPA argue that the Former Owners’ liability under the 
Clean Air Act was transferred to the Current Owners as 
part of the Plant’s sale. 
14
 Although § 7475(a) refers only to construction, the 
Clean Air Act defines construction as including 
modification of an existing pollution source.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 7479(2)(C); Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 
561, 568 (2007). 
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“modifications,” see 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C), it does not 
include “operation.”  And § 7475(a) does not exactly try 
to hide its exclusive link to construction and 
modification: after all, the section is titled 
“Preconstruction Requirements”—not “Preconstruction 
and Operational Requirements.”  In short, “[n]othing in 
the text of § 7475 even hints at the possibility that a fresh 
violation occurs every day until the end of the universe if 
an owner that lacks a construction permit operates a 
completed facility.”  United States v. Midwest 
Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d 644, 647 (7th Cir. 2013); see 
also Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d 1008, 
1015 (8th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit 
that operating a modified facility without a PSD permit is 
simply “not articulated as a basis for a violation” 
(quoting Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth. (Nat’l Parks 11th Cir.), 502 F.3d 1316, 
1323 (11th Cir. 2007))).  Instead, “[t]he violation is 
complete when construction [or modification] 
commences without a permit in hand.”  Midwest 
Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d at 647. 
 Section 7475’s omission of any reference to 
“operation” takes on dispositive significance given that 
other parts of the Clean Air Act establish operational 
conditions by “employing plain and explicit language.”  
Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d at 1015.  Two examples 
suffice: 42 U.S.C. § 7411(e) makes it “unlawful . . . to 
operate” a facility in violation of New Source 
 29 
 
Performance Standards.  Title V similarly prohibits any 
person from “operat[ing]” a source “except in 
compliance with a [Title V operating] permit” and notes 
in the very next sentence that nothing in Title V “shall be 
construed to alter the applicable requirements of [the 
PSD program] that a permit be obtained before 
construction or modification.”  42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) 
(emphasis added).  Congress’s choice to explicitly refer 
to operating conditions elsewhere, but not in § 7475(a), 
can only be deliberate, especially in such comprehensive 
legislation.  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 
452 (2002) (“When Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely[.]” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)).  We cannot override that choice.  
See Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d at 1015 (“Where 
Congress has intended to establish operational conditions 
under the Clean Air Act, it has clearly said so.  But it has 
not done so for the PSD program.”). 
 The PSD program’s enforcement provisions 
confirm this.  The EPA and States can “take such 
measures . . . as necessary to prevent the construction or 
modification” of a source to which the PSD requirements 
apply.  42 U.S.C. § 7477 (emphasis added).  The Act 
authorizes citizen suits “against any person who proposes 
to construct or constructs” (or, by definition, proposes 
“to modify or modifies”) a facility without a required 
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PSD permit or violates any condition of a PSD permit.  
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (emphasis added).  Nowhere do 
these provisions authorize enforcement against a person 
who “operates” a source without satisfying applicable 
PSD requirements.
15
  
                                                 
15
 The EPA relies on an isolated piece of legislative 
history from the 1990 amendments to show that Congress 
intended to authorize the EPA to prevent sources from 
operating out of compliance with the PSD requirements.   
In 1990, the EPA’s enforcement authority under 42 
U.S.C. § 7477 authorized it to “take such measures . . . as 
necessary to prevent the construction” of a source 
violating the PSD requirements.  As part of the 1990 
changes, Congress considered and rejected a Senate 
amendment that would have added the terms “operation” 
and “modification” such that § 7477 would have 
authorized the EPA to “take such measures . . . as 
necessary to prevent the construction, operation, or 
modification of a major emitting facility.”  S. Rep. No. 
101-228, at 376 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3385, 3759.  Instead, Congress adopted a House 
amendment that added the term “modification” but not 
the term “operation.”  H.R. Rep. No. 101-490(I) § 609 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 WL 258792, at *178.  That 
amendment gave § 7477 its current form, which 
authorizes the EPA to “take such measures . . . as 
necessary to prevent the construction or modification” of 
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a source violating the PSD requirements.  In explaining 
this choice, the Conference Report stated that the House 
amendment 
 
recognizes existing law which allows EPA 
to initiate enforcement actions against 
sources that are being constructed or 
modified in violation of new source 
requirements, and leaves intact the current 
interpretation of the Agency that allows 
action against sources that are operating in 
violation of new source requirements. 
 
136 Cong. Rec. 36007, 36086 (Oct. 27, 1990) (Chaffee-
Baucus Statement of Senate Managers, S. 1630, The 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990) (emphasis added).    
 The EPA considers this statement proof that 
Congress deliberately omitted “operation” from the 
EPA’s § 7477 enforcement authority because it believed 
the EPA “already ha[d] that authority,” not to eliminate 
such authority.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 12:15–20.  But proof it is 
not.  As is always the case with Congress’s rejection of 
an amendment, its meaning is elusive.  Perhaps Congress 
rejected the amendment because it disagreed with the 
amendment’s legal directive and did not want to adopt 
that directive as law.  See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 
622 (2004) (“This [interpretation] is underscored by 
drafting history showing that Congress cut out the very 
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 The EPA responds by identifying other provisions 
that purport to turn the PSD requirements into 
operational conditions.  It points to § 7604(a)(1), which 
authorizes citizen suits for violations of “an emission 
standard or limitation,” which is defined to include “any 
requirement to obtain a permit as a condition of 
                                                                                                             
language in the bill that would have authorized any 
presumed damages.”). Equally as likely, however, is that 
Congress rejected the amendment agreeing with the legal 
principle in the amendment but believing that the 
amendment was unnecessary because the statute already 
expressed that principle.  Here, the situation is even 
murkier because Congress enacted the 1990 amendments 
under the assumption that all sources would receive a 
required PSD permit before construction or modification 
began.  See infra discussion at pp. 31–32.  Therefore, 
Congress’s otherwise-absolute statement might reflect a 
narrower belief that the EPA could enforce the PSD 
requirements against sources operating in violation of 
their PSD permit—an uncontroversial proposition.  
Given the statute’s clarity, we need not try to recreate 
what the Conference Report meant by this statement.  See 
Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 
(2013) (“[W]e assum[e] that the ordinary meaning of [the 
statutory] language accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
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operations,” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(f)(4).  But § 7604(a)(1) 
merely creates a private cause of action against a person 
who is required to (but does not) obtain a permit as a 
condition of operations.  It does not say that a PSD 
permit is, in fact, a condition of operations.   
 The EPA takes the next logical step, arguing that 
obtaining a PSD permit—and not just the PSD 
requirements themselvse—is itself a condition of 
operations, notwithstanding all the plain text to the 
contrary.  The agency’s argument is simple: obtaining a 
PSD permit is a condition of operating a source because 
PSD permits impose some operational conditions on the 
sources they govern.  For example, § 7475(a)(1) requires 
the permit to “set[] forth emission limitations” that will 
govern post-construction operation.  Subsection (a)(4) 
requires that the source be subject to BACT-based 
emission controls.  And subsection (a)(7) sets ongoing 
monitoring requirements during post-construction 
operation.   
 But Ockham’s Razor reminds us that simplicity in 
argument, without more, is no barometer of merit.  As the 
Eighth Circuit explained, “[e]ven though the 
preconstruction permitting process may establish 
obligations which continue to govern a facility’s 
operation after construction, that does not necessarily 
mean that such parameters are enforceable independent 
of the permitting process.”  Otter Tail Power Co., 615 
F.3d at 1017.  In other words, just because the PSD 
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program requires a source to obtain a permit that sets 
some operating conditions does not mean that the PSD 
program requires a source without a permit to comply 
with operating conditions.  Indeed, even the EPA’s own 
regulations distinguish between unlawful modifications 
and unlawful operations: 
Any owner or operator who constructs or 
operates a source or modification not in 
accordance with the [PSD] application . . . 
or with the terms of any approval to 
construct, or any owner or operator of a 
source or modification . . . who commences 
construction . . . without applying for and 
receiving approval [under the PSD 
program], shall be subject to appropriate 
enforcement action. 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(1) (emphasis added).  Had the EPA 
wanted to make operating without a required PSD permit 
unlawful, the last half of this regulation would use the 
term “operates” just like the first half does: “any owner 
or operator of a source or modification . . . who 
commences construction or operates a source or 
modification without applying for and receiving approval 
[under the PSD program].”  But the regulation does not 
say that. 
 Alternatively, the EPA argues that § 7475(a) is 
merely a rule of timing that starts the PSD permitting 
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requirements at the time of construction or modification.  
Yet § 7475(a) does not say that “a violation starts when a 
major emitting facility is constructed or modified 
without” meeting the PSD requirements.  Rather, 
§ 7475(a) prohibits modifying and constructing facilities 
without satisfying the PSD requirements.  More to the 
point, this timing argument is just a repackaging of its 
contention that § 7475(a) imposes operational conditions. 
 Similar reasons doom the EPA’s argument that 
BACT is a freestanding requirement that applies to 
operating sources regardless of whether a source obtains 
a PSD permit before construction or modification.  For 
this proposition, the EPA quotes § 7475(a)(4)’s statement 
that a “proposed facility is subject to the best available 
control technology for each [regulated] pollutant” 
(emphasis added).  That present-tense language might 
seem to create an ongoing obligation to use BACT 
regardless of a PSD permit’s terms or existence.  Except 
that the subsection says more than the language EPA 
quotes.  Under § 7475(a)(4), “[n]o major emitting facility 
. . . may be constructed . . . unless (4) the proposed 
facility is subject to the best available control technology 
for each [regulated] pollutant.”  The BACT requirement 
is simply part of § 7475’s prohibition on construction—
not operation.  Otherwise, § 7475(a)(4) would declare 
that “[n]o major emitting facility . . . may be constructed 
or operated . . . unless (4) the proposed facility is subject 
to” BACT. As is, though, the BACT requirement is “not 
 36 
 
a freestanding [operational] requirement.”  Otter Tail 
Power Co., 615 F.3d at 1016.   And as the Seventh 
Circuit illustrated, it would not violate § 7475 even “[i]f 
the owners ripped out or deactivated the best available 
control technology after finishing construction,” (though 
it might violate some other law).  Midwest Generation, 
LLC, 720 F.3d at 647; see Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 484 (2004) 
(describing subsections (a)(1) and (a)(4) as creating an 
“express preconstruction requirement” to include “a 
BACT determination in a facility’s PSD permit”). 
 Even if we take the EPA’s argument on its own 
terms and ignore the construction limitation preceding 
subsection (4), the argument ignores the word 
“proposed.”  42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).  After all, if the 
BACT requirement is interpreted as a freestanding 
requirement separate from the PSD permitting process, 
then facilities that never obtained PSD permits would 
have to apply BACT as a condition of operations after 
construction is completed.  But if construction is 
completed, then the facilities are no longer “proposed” 
facilities, making that word meaningless.  See Corley v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“[O]ne of the 
most basic interpretive canons [is] that [a] statute should 
be construed . . . so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, void or insignificant.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)).  Subsection (4) is no more 
than a congressional mandate to require constructed and 
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modified facilities in attainment areas to use BACT 
rather than an alternative emissions standard—such as 
the more-stringent lowest achievable emission rate 
(LAER), which does not require a cost-benefit analysis 
and applies to nonattainment areas exceeding the 
NAAQS.   
 Apart from any issue of statutory interpretation, a 
freestanding BACT requirement would not survive in the 
real world.  BACT determinations are products of the 
permitting process, “tailored to each facility ‘on a case-
by-case basis’” using cost-benefit analysis specific to 
each pollution source.  Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d at 
1017 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3)); see also 40 C.F.R. 
§ 52.21(b)(12) (similar).  There is no statutory or 
regulatory provision (outside of some individual states’ 
SIPs) for obtaining a BACT determination outside of the 
PSD permitting process.  Without an issued PSD permit, 
there are no BACT emission limits to violate.  Tellingly, 
the EPA cannot explain what the BACT limits are for the 
Plant in this case because the permitting process has not 
occurred.  See U.S. Reply Br. at 10 (“BACT is typically 
specified during the permitting process. . . . [But] the 
precise BACT standard for a particular source need not 
be pre-determined for an operator to violate the BACT 
obligation.”). 
 Without supporting statutory text, the EPA falls 
back on (and the States primarily rely upon) policy 
arguments.  Given the clarity of the statute, these 
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concerns have no place in the process of statutory 
interpretation.  Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 
526 (1987) (“Where, as here, the language of a provision 
. . . is sufficiently clear in context and not at odds with 
the legislative history, . . . [there is no occasion] to 
examine the additional considerations of policy that may 
have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the 
statute.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)).  But lest one be concerned that 
the EPA’s parade of horribles may come to pass, such 
fears are inflated.  First, it is not true that “a company 
that modifies a facility without obtaining a PSD permit or 
installing [BACT] pollution controls would be subject to 
a maximum total penalty of [only] $37,500” (the 
maximum daily fine).  U.S. Br. at 46; States Br. at 60.  
Like Rome, facilities are not built—or modified—in a 
day.  It is possible that the maximum daily fine accrues 
each day the owner or operator spends modifying or 
constructing the facility—from the beginning of 
construction to the end of construction.  An owner or 
operator who modifies a facility every day for a year 
without satisfying the PSD requirements presumably 
commits a violation every day and is subject to one 
year’s worth of daily fines—or more than $13 million.   
 But even assuming that the EPA is correct that 
only a single daily fine applies, that penalty is not 
“laughably inadequate to encourage PSD compliance.”  
Id.  Congress has endowed the EPA with other tools to 
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deter would-be violators—from injunctive remedies that 
include terminating new construction and requiring 
extensive modifications, see 42 U.S.C. § 7477, to 
criminal penalties against those who “knowingly 
violate[]” the Clean Air Act, including by failing to 
obtain a PSD permit before construction or modification, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1).  And its enforcement arsenal 
is not limited to violators.  If a state under-enforces the 
Clean Air Act or its own SIP, the EPA can take action to 
bring the SIP into compliance and can even directly 
revise the SIP if necessary.  40 C.F.R. § 51.166(a)(3).   
 Nor is the EPA unable to know which sources are 
modified or constructed.  To be sure, sources are not 
required to report or obtain a PSD permit for routine 
maintenance that they believe falls below a “major 
modification.”  But that does not consign the EPA to 
playing whack-a-polluter by guessing which sources 
should be the target of its enforcement efforts.  The EPA 
is statutorily empowered to require any source owner or 
operator, regulated party, or any person “who the 
Administrator believes may have information necessary” 
for implementing the Clean Air Act and determining 
violations—that is, nearly anyone in the United States—
“on a one-time, periodic, or continuous basis” to keep 
records, make reports, and submit to inspections, 
monitoring, and emissions sampling, and “provide such 
other information as the Administrator may reasonably 
require.”  42 U.S.C. § 7414(a).  States, as the Clean Air 
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Act’s primary enforcers, have similarly broad 
investigative powers.  Given the breadth of these powers, 
we see no reason why the EPA and States lack authority 
to require the advance reporting of some or all proposed 
changes to facilities, whether or not they rise to a 
modification. 
 At the end of the day, there may or may not be a 
reasonable explanation for Congress’s choice not to 
impose the PSD requirements as operational conditions.  
On one hand, the Clean Air Act was not designed solely 
for the purpose of saving the environment at all costs.  
Like any legislation, it is a congressional compromise 
between competing purposes—in the Clean Air Act’s 
case, “between interests seeking strict schemes to reduce 
pollution rapidly” and other “interests advancing the 
economic concern that strict schemes would retard 
industrial development.”  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 847 (1984).  As a 
result, Congress designed the Clean Air Act to protect the 
nation’s air quality and to protect the “reasonable 
expectations of facility operators” and the “significant 
investment of regulatory resources made by state 
permitting agencies.”  Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d at 
1022.  That compromise might well be reflected in the 
omission of PSD requirements as operational conditions: 
If the EPA does not object within five years of the 
completion of a facility’s modification, then it loses the 
right to seek civil penalties under the statute of 
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limitations, but can still obtain an injunction requiring the 
owner or operator to comply with the PSD requirements.  
But when more than five years have passed since the end 
of construction and the facility has been taken over by 
new owners and operators, the Clean Air Act protects 
their reasonable investment expectations. 
 On the other hand, perhaps the omission of PSD 
requirements as operational conditions was simply an 
oversight.  Congress pieced together the Clean Air Act 
over decades as it reacted to the latest regulatory 
obstacles.  And there is some evidence that whenever the 
topic of the PSD permitting process arose, Congress 
simply assumed that a PSD permit would be issued 
before construction or modification began.  See H.R. 
Rep. No. 95-294, at 144–45 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1223–24; S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 32 
(1977); H.R. Rep. No. 95-564, at 153 (1977) (Conf. 
Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1502, 1533; see 
also Julie Martin, Note, Enforcement for Construction 
Without PSD Permit and BACT Compliance, 16 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 563, 619 (2008) (explaining that because of 
Congress’s assumption, the “Clean Air Act does not 
explicitly address the possibility of a facility’s 
construction and eventual operation without the requisite 
permission to install uncontrolled emissions sources”).  
Either way, we cannot modify the statute: if an 
intentional choice reflecting a compromise, we cannot 
adjust the bargain Congress has struck; if an oversight, 
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we cannot usurp legislative authority to fix the omission.  
See, e.g., Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 526 (“Deciding what 
competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the 
achievement of a particular objective is the very essence 
of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than 
effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that 
whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be 
the law.”). 
 Aside from the federal statutes and regulations, the 
EPA turns to the Pennsylvania SIP as a source of 
freestanding PSD requirements.
16
  But Pennsylvania’s 
SIP merely parallels the Clean Air Act’s PSD 
requirements and does nothing to transform the PSD 
permitting requirements into operating conditions.  For 
example, 25 Pa. Code § 127.11 prohibits a person from 
“caus[ing] or permit[ting] the construction or 
modification”—not operation—“of an air contamination 
source” unless the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection has approved the source’s plan 
for construction or modification.  And like the EPA’s 
own regulation at 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(1), the 
Pennsylvania SIP requires sources to operate in 
compliance with their application for plan approval and 
                                                 
16
 The EPA has approved Pennsylvania’s SIP.  See 40 
C.F.R. §§ 52.2020–52.2063; 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842, 10,889 
(May 31, 1972); 49 Fed. Reg. 33,127 (Aug. 21, 1984); 61 
Fed. Reg. 39,597 (July 30, 1996). 
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“the conditions in the plan approval issued by the 
Department”—which does not prohibit operation without 
an approved plan (or PSD permit).  25 Pa. Code 
§ 127.25.  To be sure, the Pennsylvania SIP does 
authorize the Department to “issue an operating permit to 
an existing and operating source that is out of compliance 
with . . . the Clean Air Act or the regulations thereunder.”  
25 Pa. Code § 127.445(a).  But that provision, which 
allows the Department to issue corrective operating 
permits for sources lacking required PSD permits, hardly 
requires the owners and operators to apply for PSD 
permits as a condition of operation.   
The Pennsylvania SIP’s omission of any language 
imposing an operational duty to obtain an approved plan 
(or PSD permit) aligns this case with the Eighth and 
Eleventh Circuits’ decisions, both of which refused to 
infer ongoing obligations from SIPs with similar 
language.  Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d at 1015; Nat’l 
Parks 11th Cir., 502 F.3d at 1323–25.  That same 
omission distinguishes this case from the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in National Parks Conservation Association v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, which interpreted the 
Tennessee SIP’s unique language as “establish[ing] that 
the duty to obtain a construction permit containing the 
proper emissions limits is ongoing, even post-
construction.”  Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth., 480 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir. 2007); see also 
Midwest Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d at 64 (“[T]he [S]ixth 
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[C]ircuit’s decision rests on Tennessee statutes and 
implementation plans that require certain sources to use 
[BACT] . . . .”). 
 In short, § 7475(a) unambiguously prohibits only 
constructing or modifying a facility without meeting PSD 
requirements.
17
  The Current Owners have done neither; 
                                                 
17
 The EPA relies on various regulations that purport to 
create operational duties to obtain a PSD permit and use 
BACT.  With these regulations in hand, it claims 
Chevron deference for the regulations’ interpretation of 
the Clean Air Act and Auer deference for its 
interpretation of those regulations.  This argument fails at 
each step.  First, the cited regulations unambiguously 
track the PSD program in prohibiting only construction 
or modification, not operation, without getting a PSD 
permit or using BACT.  See Otter Tail Power Co., 615 
F.3d at 1016–17.  Second, the EPA is not entitled to Auer 
deference because the regulations are clear.  Christensen 
v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (“Auer 
deference is warranted only when the language of the 
regulation is ambiguous.”).  Third, even if the regulations 
were ambiguous, we would still not defer to the EPA’s 
interpretation of the PSD regulations as imposing 
operational duties because such an interpretation would 
contradict the unambiguous text of § 7475(a).  Hagans v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2012) 
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they have only operated the Plant.  As a result, the 
District Court correctly dismissed the civil-penalty and 
injunctive relief sought against the Current Owners.
18
 
2. Against the Former Owners 
 That leaves the PSD claims against the Former 
Owners.  Although the EPA has been less than 
forthcoming about what its proposed injunction would 
accomplish, it has offered two possibilities: (1) ordering 
the Former Owners to install BACT at the Plant, and (2) 
ordering the Former Owners to purchase emissions 
                                                                                                             
(“[W]e need reach the [Chevron] deference question only 
if the statutory language is ambiguous.”). 
18
 The EPA does not argue that the statute of limitations 
should be equitably tolled—an argument we need not 
address.  See Michael J. Cole, A Blueprint for EPA: How 
the Agency Can Overcome the Statute of Limitations 
When Enforcing PSD Under the Clean Air Act, 31 Utah 
Envtl. L. Rev. 181, 192 (2011) (arguing that “courts 
should toll the statute of limitations for a power plant’s 
PSD violations if the plant fails to disclose to the state 
authorities that it undertakes a major modification”); see 
also Knight v. Brown Transp. Corp., 806 F.2d 479, 484 
(3d Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that equitable tolling 
applies where the defendant had a duty to disclose 
information to the plaintiff and the defendant’s failure to 
disclose information prevented the plaintiff from 
realizing that he had a claim). 
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credits and retire them unused, effectively reducing the 
amount of sulfur dioxide that facilities elsewhere in the 
nation can emit.  The District Court dismissed this 
request for a permanent injunction, concluding that 
mandatory injunctions are available only for ongoing 
violations and “the Former Owners’ alleged PSD 
violations constituted wholly[] past failures to obtain pre-
construction permits that did not constitute continuing 
violations.”  JA29.  We will affirm that dismissal on a 
narrower ground.  The text of the Clean Air Act does not 
authorize an injunction against former owners and 
operators for a wholly past PSD violation, even if that 
violation causes ongoing harm.
19
  See Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[W]e 
may affirm [the District Court’s decision] on any ground 
supported by the record.”). 
 The Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to bring a 
civil enforcement action when any person has violated a 
permit or SIP, has violated any requirement in certain 
subchapters of the Clean Air Act (including the PSD 
program), or “attempts to construct or modify a major 
stationary source” in any state that the EPA 
                                                 
19
 Because we base our conclusion solely on the statutory 
text of the Clean Air Act, we express no opinion on the 
District Court’s conclusion that mandatory injunctions 
are not available in general to remedy ongoing harm from 
wholly past violations. 
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Administrator has found out of compliance with the New 
Source Review program.  42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5), (b)(1)–
(3).  That same provision limits a district court’s 
jurisdiction to awarding certain kinds of relief.  District 
courts have jurisdiction only “to restrain such violation, 
to require compliance, to assess such civil penalty, to 
collect [certain] fees owed the United States,” and “to 
award any other appropriate relief.”  Id. § 7413(b).  Each 
type of relief in this list (except for civil penalties
20
) is 
necessarily forward-looking.  A district court, for 
example, cannot “collect” fees that were owed to the 
United States in the past but are no longer owed.  And 
with time travel yet to be discovered, it is impossible to 
“restrain” a violation that occurred twenty years ago.  
Likewise, courts cannot “require compliance” from 
defendants who are not currently violating the Clean Air 
Act and who cannot violate the Act in the future because 
they no longer own or operate the source.  Cf. Gwaltney 
of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 
U.S. 49, 59 (1987) (interpreting the Clean Water Act’s 
citizen-suit provision, which authorizes citizens to seek 
civil penalties against a person who “is in violation” of 
                                                 
20
 Civil penalties are the only type of relief in this list that 
can be imposed for past violations.  That fact does not 
change our analysis because the separate five-year statute 
of limitations authorizes civil penalties for violations up 
to five years in the past, and civil penalties—as opposed 
to injunctive relief—are necessarily retrospective. 
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the Act, and concluding that this phrase “makes plain” 
that the “harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit 
[must] lie[] in the present or the future, not the past”).    
 The only remaining term in the statute—“any other 
appropriate relief”—might initially appear to give district 
courts broad authority to fashion injunctive relief against 
former owners and operators.  But this general catch-all 
cannot be read so broadly as to authorize an injunction 
for completed violations.  Under the canon of ejusdem 
generis, a “general term” (“any other appropriate relief”) 
following a “series of specific items” (“restrain such 
violation,” “require compliance,” and so on) “is confined 
to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it 
follows.”   Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 
U.S. 576, 586 (2008); see also Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. 
& Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 
U.S. 371, 385 (2003) (interpreting “other legal process” 
as limited to “some judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism” 
transferring property to discharge liability to be 
consistent with the preceding terms “levy, attachment, 
[and] garnishment”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 
532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (interpreting “any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce” after “seamen” and “railroad employees” as 
covering only transportation workers).   
 Of course, Congress does not intend every 
seemingly open-ended phrase to be read narrowly.  See 
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 226 (2008) 
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(“[W]e do not woodenly apply limiting principles every 
time Congress includes a specific example along with a 
general phrase.”).  From time to time, a broadly worded 
statutory term is intended to be just that—broad.  For 
example, Congress sometimes inserts “technically 
unnecessary” examples along with a general description 
of those examples not because it intends the general term 
to be narrow, but instead “out of an abundance of 
caution” to ensure the general term will be interpreted as 
capturing those examples.  Fort Stewart Sch. v. Fed. 
Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 646 (1990); see 
also Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 140 & n.4 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (declining to apply ejusdem 
generis where the statute indicates a “special reason for 
emphasizing specific examples of a statutory class” that 
“negate[s]” a narrow interpretation of the general term).  
In addition, just as we “typically use ejusdem generis to 
ensure that a general word will not render specific words 
meaningless,” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1113 (2011), the opposite is 
also true: general phrases cannot be so narrowly 
construed that they become meaningless, see Christopher 
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2171 
(2012) (citing United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 682 
(1950)).
21
  And finally, not every general or vague phrase 
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 The EPA does not argue that our interpretation of “any 
other appropriate relief” in § 7413(b) leaves that phrase 
meaningless.  In any event, without speculating too much 
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following an enumerated list is a catch-all.  Some statutes 
use a general phrase not as a residual category intended 
to be a more general description of the preceding terms, 
but instead use each of the terms, including the general 
phrase, as independent and unrelated statutory categories.  
See Ali, 552 U.S. at 226  (declining to apply ejusdem 
generis to the “disjunctive” phrase “any officer of 
customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer”); 
Watt v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 44 n.5 (1983) 
(declining to apply ejusdem generis to the phrase “coal 
and other minerals”). 
Yet sometimes a catch-all is just a catch-all.  That 
is true here.  “Any other appropriate relief” follows “a list 
of specific items separated by commas.”  Ali, 552 U.S. at 
225.  As the word “other” demonstrates, this general 
phrase is a residual category of the same type as the 
preceding items (namely, kinds of relief).  Id.  The 
                                                                                                             
on questions not before us, we can readily conceive of 
injunctive relief for an ongoing violation that does not 
either “restrain” that violation or “require compliance.”  
For instance, an owner or operator with an ongoing 
violation might be ordered not only to correct the 
violation and bring its pollution into compliance with any 
emission requirements, but also place it on a probationary 
period requiring more stringent monitoring, submission 
to regular inspections, or reporting all changes to its 
facility to prevent future violations. 
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specific types of relief do not overlap or otherwise 
suggest that they are mere examples of “any . . . 
appropriate relief.”  Consequently, any injunctive relief 
available under this residual phrase must be limited to 
ongoing violations, consistent with the specific forward-
looking injunctive remedies that precede it.The EPA 
disagrees, insisting on a broad and flexible interpretation 
of “any appropriate relief.”  Wielding a separate canon of 
interpretation, the EPA argues that remedial statutes like 
the Clean Air Act must be interpreted broadly to 
effectuate their remedial purposes.  As an initial matter, 
we doubt that such a broad interpretive rule can be 
justified on its own terms.  See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 51 (2008) 
(rejecting this canon’s application to a statute that 
Congress had more than a “single purpose” in enacting 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  As the 
Supreme Court has consistently reminded courts, “no 
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”  Pension 
Benefits Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 646 
(1990) (quoting Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 525–26); see also 
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2242 (2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Dolan v. United States, 130 S. 
Ct. 2533, 2547 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 117 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  That principle applies even to remedial 
statutes (and what laws are not designed to remedy some 
problem?).  “[I]t frustrates rather than effectuates 
legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever 
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furthers the statute’s primary objective”—such as 
remedying environmental harms—“must be the law.”  
Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 525–26. 
But even if such an interpretive rule were a 
justifiable one, it would not trump the textual clues to the 
contrary.  Not all interpretive rules are created equal.  
Some are descriptively justified, establishing rules about 
how Congress and the public use language as well as 
“regularize[ing] the courts’ approach to some recurring 
sources of ambiguity in English syntax.”  Caleb Nelson, 
Statutory Interpretation 82 (2011); see also Stephen F. 
Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should 
Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 
561, 563 (1992) (proposing this distinction); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 
103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 454–60 (1989) (similar).  
Examples of those language-based heuristics include the 
presumptions that “words used in a statute are to be given 
their ordinary meaning,” Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 
581 (1975), that “identical words used in different parts 
of the same statute” have the same meaning, IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005), that statutory text 
should not be interpreted “in a way that makes part of it 
redundant,” unnecessary, or meaningless, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 
669 (2007), that adjectives and other modifiers refer only 
to the last antecedent, see Jama v. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 342–43 (2005), 
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and—most relevant here—that a general catch-all should 
be interpreted in light of any preceding specific terms.  
Others are normatively justified, designed to achieve 
certain policy goals that courts have identified.  Nelson, 
Statutory Interpretation 82 (“[A]t least some of the 
canons . . . put thumbs on the scale in favor of certain 
substantive policies[,] . . . telling courts how to proceed 
when their information about the enacting legislature’s 
likely intent has run out.”).  The most familiar example is 
the rule of lenity.  And the remaining canons are hybrids 
whose scope can be fully explained only by a 
combination of descriptive and normative justifications.  
See Nelson, Statutory Interpretation, 138, 146 
(cataloguing the various canons and offering the saving 
canon and constitutional-avoidance doctrine as two 
examples of hybrid canons). 
Consistent with our focus on determining the 
meaning of the text itself, we turn to our descriptive 
canons first whenever we confront a statute we must 
interpret.  See id. at 228 (“[T]here is fairly widespread 
agreement that so-called ‘descriptive’ canons occupy a 
higher place in the interpretive hierarchy than so-called 
‘normative’ canons.”); id. at 229 (“To the extent that a 
single canon serves both ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ 
goals, moreover, courts should try to avoid letting the 
canon’s normative aspirations swamp the descriptive 
force of other canons.”).  If our descriptive tools settle 
the meaning, then our task is complete.  In such a case, 
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we do not even consider interpretive tools partially or 
purely based on normative goals.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (“The rule of lenity 
applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid 
can be derived, . . . we can make no more than a guess as 
to what Congress intended.” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)). 
Such is the case here.  Our descriptive tools of 
interpretation clarify any vagueness in the phrase “any 
other appropriate relief.”  As we have explained, the 
canon of ejusdem generis requires us to interpret this 
catch-all as permitting forward-looking relief, consistent 
with the preceding types of relief in the list.  Allowing 
the EPA’s remedial-purpose canon to trump ejusdem 
generis would amount to little more than disguising a 
purpose-driven interpretation as a canon.  The PSD 
program’s other enforcement provision confirms the 
prospective nature of injunctive relief allowed.  Section 
7477 authorizes “injunctive relief[] as necessary to 
prevent the construction or modification of [certain] 
major emitting facilit[ies].”  An injunction to remedy 
modifications completed in the past without a PSD 
permit cannot “prevent” the construction. 
And even if the phrase “any other appropriate 
relief” can include injunctions against former owners and 
past violators, the requested injunctions in this case are 
not “appropriate.”  Whatever the breadth of that phrase, it 
would not be “appropriate” for a district court to award 
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relief that is impossible to fulfill.  Ordering the Former 
Owners to install BACT on a plant they no longer own, 
operate, or have access to is just the sort of impossible 
relief that would not be “appropriate.”  That is especially 
so given that a “mandatory injunction . . . is an 
extraordinary remedial process.”  Morrison v. Work, 266 
U.S. 481, 490 (1925) (Brandeis, J.); United States v. 
Bigan, 274 F.2d 729, 733 (3d Cir. 1960) (same). 
The EPA tries to cure this impropriety in two 
ways.  First, it proposes that the District Court enjoin the 
Current Owners to cooperate with the Former Owners to 
install BACT.  Or, the EPA suggests, the District Court 
can order the Former Owners to pay the Current Owners 
for the cost of BACT and order the Current Owners to 
install it.   
Both of these proposals suffer from the same flaw.  
As we have already held, the Current Owners cannot be 
held liable for violating the PSD or BACT requirements.  
If the Current Owners cannot be held liable, then the 
District Court has no authority to enjoin them at all.  See 
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 
844, 850 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff must first 
establish a successful claim on the merits against a party 
before being eligible to obtain injunctive relief against 
that party).  Without the cooperation of the Current 
Owners, the Former Owners “would not be able to 
comply with a court order directing [them] to install 
pollution control measures, because [they] no longer 
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control[] the plant.”  N.J. v. Reliant Energy Mid-Atlantic 
Power Holdings, LLC, 2009 WL 3234438, at *17 (E.D. 
Pa. 2009).  Given these constraints on remedying the 
Former Owners’ past alleged violations of the PSD 
program and the EPA’s failure to allege “a continuing 
violation or the likelihood of a future violation,” 
injunctive relief against the Former Owners “will not 
redress [the public’s] injury.”  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998). 
Second, the EPA proposes that the District Court 
order the Former Owner to purchase and retire emissions 
credits to offset pollution elsewhere in the nation.  This 
proposal fares no better.  Such injunctive cap-and-trade 
relief is the equivalent of awarding monetary relief and 
“could not reasonably be characterized as an injunction.”  
United States v. Midwest Generation, 781 F. Supp. 2d 
677, 685 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff’d on other grounds by 720 
F.3d 644, 648; see In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee 
Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1145 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[W]e have 
never upheld an injunction where the claimed injury 
constituted a loss of money, a loss capable of recoupment 
in a proper action at law.”).  It would amount to little 
more than an end-run around the five-year statute of 
limitations on “any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, 
pecuniary or otherwise.”  28 U.S.C. § 2462. 
In fact, the inspiration for this suggested relief 
comes from Title IV of the Clean Air Act—a program 
regulating acid rain and deposition and an entirely 
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different one than the Former Owners allegedly violated.  
Had Congress intended to authorize an emissions-credit 
marketplace for the PSD program (Title II) like the one 
established for the sulfur dioxide allowance program 
(Title IV), it would have done so.  Since Congress 
deliberately omitted such an allowance program from the 
PSD program, we will not import it under the guise of 
injunctive relief. 
Indeed, when Congress has wanted to authorize 
mandatory remedial injunctions in other environmental 
statutes, it has done so expressly.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(2) (extending liability under CERCLA to “any 
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substances owned or operated any facility at which such 
hazardous substances were disposed of”); 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1321(b)(9) (broadly authorizing orders to “mitigate the 
damage to the public health or welfare caused by [a] 
discharge”).  Congress chose not to extend such remedial 
authority to the Clean Air Act. 
Finally, and tellingly, the EPA concedes that in the 
forty-plus years of the Clean Air Act, no court has ever 
approved such an injunction against former owners.  See 
Oral Arg. Tr. at 16:19–21.  We decline to be the first. 
B. Title V Claims 
 In addition to its PSD claims, the EPA alleges that 
the Current and Former Owners violated the Title V 
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operating-permit program.  The Former Owners’ Title V 
application was allegedly incomplete because it did not 
include applicable PSD requirements or BACT controls.  
And the Current Owners’ facially valid permit is 
supposedly inadequate because it omits the same 
requirements—even though the EPA approved the 
application, issued the permit, and recently renewed the 
permit without objection.  The District Court dismissed 
these claims on the merits, concluding that Title V does 
not make incomplete applications and permits civilly 
actionable.  We agree with the District Court’s dismissal, 
but for a more fundamental reason: the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction over these claims.
22
  See In re Flat 
Glass Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 83, 88 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(explaining our “independent responsibility” to confirm 
our appellate jurisdiction and the District Court’s 
jurisdiction (quoting In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 
958–59 (3d Cir. 1997))). 
 As the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have 
held, Title V channels challenges to applications and 
permits into an administrative review process that is 
reviewable exclusively by the courts of appeals, not 
collaterally in civil or criminal enforcement actions in the 
                                                 
22
 To the District Court’s credit, it “harbor[ed] substantial 
subject-matter jurisdiction concerns as to its authority to 
decide” the Title V claims for the same reasons we 
express here. 
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district courts.  Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d at 1020; 
Romoland  Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC, 
548 F.3d 738, 742–43 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
AM Gen. Corp., 34 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1994); see 
also N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. v. Johnson, 
427 F.3d 172, 185 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n enforcement 
proceeding does not relieve the EPA of its obligations 
under the permitting process.”).  We begin with § 7661d, 
which establishes a comprehensive system for the EPA’s 
review of Title V applications and proposed permits.  
“Congress entrusted state permitting authorities with 
initial responsibility to make BACT determinations ‘case 
by case.’”  Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. 
at 488 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3)).  Title V requires 
these state permitting authorities to submit permit 
applications and proposed permits to affected states and 
the EPA for review.  42 U.S.C. § 7661d(a)(1).  The 
permitting authority must give the states an opportunity 
to review the application or proposed permit and submit 
written recommendations; if the authority declines to 
adopt any state recommendation, it must notify that state 
and the EPA and explain its reasoning.  Id.  As to the 
EPA’s review, the Administrator has a duty to object to 
“any permit [that] contains provisions” she determines to 
be “not in compliance with” the Clean Air Act.  Id. 
§ 7661d(b)(1).  If the Administrator objects, then the 
permit may not be issued unless it is revised to meet the 
objections.  Id. §§ 7661d(b)(3), (c).  And if the permitting 
authority has already issued the permit, then the 
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Administrator must “modify, terminate, or revoke such 
permit,” and the permitting authority may only issue a 
permit revised to satisfy the objection.  Id.  If the EPA 
does not object, then “any person may petition the 
Administrator within 60 days after the expiration of the 
45-day review period” to object on the public’s behalf.  
Id. § 7661d(b)(2).  The Administrator must then grant or 
deny the petition within 60 days.  Id.  “Any denial of 
such petition shall be subject to judicial review under” 42 
U.S.C. § 7607.  Id. 
 Section 7607(b)(1), in turn, authorizes direct 
review of the Administrator’s decision in the courts of 
appeals.  Id. § 7607(b)(1) (“A petition for review of . . . 
any other final action of the Administrator under [the 
Clean Air Act] (including any denial or disapproval by 
the Administrator under [Title V]) . . . may be filed only 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate 
circuit . . . .”); Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d at 1020; 
Romoland, 548 F.3d at 743.  Such review may take place 
only in the court of appeals—subsection (b)(2) divests 
the district courts of jurisdiction over the Administrator’s 
decision.  42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (“Action of the 
Administrator with respect to which review could have 
been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to 
judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for 
enforcement.”).  Consequently, Congress created a “use 
it or lose it” provision for reviewing the EPA’s failure to 
object to a proposed Title V permit.  Romoland, 548 F.3d 
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at 755.  If  review of the Administrator’s decision not to 
object to a Title V application or permit “could have been 
obtained” through this process, then that challenge 
cannot be brought in an enforcement proceeding. 
 Here, the EPA claims that the Current Owners’ 
Title V permit, though facially valid, is missing 
applicable PSD requirements and BACT controls.  And 
the EPA (but not the States) claims that the Former 
Owners’ Title V application was incomplete because it 
omitted those same requirements.  But each of these 
claims “amounts to an allegation that the permit ‘is not in 
compliance with the requirements of’” the Clean Air Act, 
“claim[s] which could have been pressed during the 
permitting process.”  Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d at 
1020.  If the EPA Administrator believed the application 
or permit was deficient, Title V required her to object 
during the permitting process.  42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(1).  
Yet twice she chose not to—either during the original 
permitting process from 1995 to 2004 or again when the 
Current Owners’ permit was renewed in 2012.  And 
those failures to object “could have been” directly 
reviewed in this Court through the exclusive process 
established by Title V.  Consequently, § 7607(b)(2) 
divests the District Court of jurisdiction over the EPA’s 
collateral challenges to the Former Owners’ application 
 62 
 
and the Current Owners’ permit.23   
 The EPA musters three cases that purportedly 
support such collateral challenges in enforcement 
proceedings.  U.S. Opening Br. at 57; see Sierra Club v. 
EPA (Sierra Club 6th Cir.), 557 F.3d 401, 405–11 (6th 
Cir. 2009); Citizens Against Ruining the Env’t v. EPA, 
535 F.3d 670, 678 (7th Cir. 2008); Sierra Club 11th Cir., 
541 F.3dat 1267.  But those cases say no such thing.  
None of them addresses § 7607’s jurisdiction-stripping 
provision or even whether a district court has jurisdiction 
over collateral challenges to Title V permits and 
applications in enforcement actions.  They instead 
interpret one of the statutory triggers for the EPA 
Administrator’s duty to object to a Title V application or 
permit during the administrative review process: whether 
a private petitioner has sufficiently “demonstrated” that 
the application or permit does not comply with the Clean 
Air Act such that the Administrator must object.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2).  In fact, in each of these cases, the 
party seeking review of the Administrator’s failure to 
object did so by petitioning for direct review in the court 
                                                 
23
 Given § 7607(b)(2)’s unambiguous elimination of the 
District Court’s jurisdiction in this case, we do not defer 
to the EPA’s contrary interpretation.  See Hagans v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]e need reach the deference question only if we find 
the statutory language is ambiguous.”). 
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of appeals—consistent with our interpretation of § 7607.  
See Sierra Club 11th Cir., 541 F.3d at 1263; Citizens 
Against Ruining the Env’t, 535 F.3d at 674; Sierra Club 
6th Cir., 557 F.3d at 405.  
 The elimination of district-court jurisdiction over 
collateral challenges to Title V permits and applications 
is further confirmed by Congress’s omission of any civil 
cause of action for submitting incomplete applications or 
operating under a validly issued but incomplete permit.  
The EPA has authority to bring a civil enforcement 
action against a person who, among other things, “has 
violated, or is in violation of, any other requirement or 
prohibition of [various subchapters, including Title V].”  
42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2).  The plain text of Title V, in 
turn, lists only two ways in which it can be violated: 
operating without a Title V permit or violating the terms 
of a Title V permit while operating a source.  See id. 
§ 7661a(a) (making it “unlawful for any person to violate 
any requirement of a permit issued under this subchapter, 
or to operate [a source] except in compliance with a 
permit issued by a permitting authority under this 
subchapter”).   
 What that text does not include as a violation, 
however, is operating in accordance with a facially valid 
but inadequate Title V permit.  As the Seventh Circuit 
has explained, there is simply no “indication that 
Congress expressly or by implication meant to authorize 
the EPA” to bring an enforcement action against current 
 64 
 
owners, who have “been operating under a permit valid 
on its face and never before challenged.”  AM Gen. 
Corp., 34 F.3d at 475; see also United States v. Cemex, 
Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1050 (D. Colo. 2012) (“The 
Court sees no possible interpretation of this language that 
would permit a cause of action for the failure to obtain a 
‘proper’ operating permit.”).  To be sure, as the EPA 
points out, Title V requires permits to include 
“enforceable emission limitations . . . and other such 
conditions as are necessary to assure compliance with 
applicable requirements of [the Clean Air Act].”  42 
U.S.C. § 7661c(a).  But just because the statute requires 
complete permits does not mean that incomplete permits 
are actionable in an enforcement action.  Indeed, 
§ 7661a(a)’s failure to make it unlawful to transgress this 
complete-permit requirement requires us to conclude that 
such conduct is not a civilly enforceable “violation” of 
Title V.  See Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1894 
(2013) (“Where Congress includes particular language in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of 
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). 
 Nor does Title V make submitting an incomplete 
permit application unlawful.  The plain text of § 7661a(a) 
does not list “submitting incomplete permit applications” 
as a violation of Title V.  Of course, as the EPA points 
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out, Title V requires a permit application to include a 
“compliance plan describing how the source will comply 
with all applicable requirements [in the Clean Air Act].”  
42 U.S.C. § 7661b(b)(1).  Again, the fact that Congress 
chose to include this complete-application requirement 
but did not include the failure to satisfy that requirement 
as a violation of Title V must be presumed deliberate.  In 
short, Congress’s decision not to authorize district-court 
actions for incomplete applications or validly issued but 
inadequate permits makes it unsurprising that § 7607 
divests the district courts of jurisdiction over such 
collateral challenges.  The thoroughness of the 
administrative review process—combined with the 
mandatory denial of applications and proposed permits as 
well as the mandatory revocation of prematurely issued, 
non-compliant permits—indicates Congress’s 
contemplation that deficiencies in Title V applications 
and proposed permits would come to light and be 
corrected through this administrative process.   
On the other hand, consider the problems that 
would arise if applications and permits could be 
challenged in an enforcement proceeding.  The EPA 
could bring parallel suits—an enforcement proceeding in 
the district court to challenge the Title V permit and 
direct review by the court of appeals to challenge the 
Administrator’s failure to object during the 
administrative process. Such “simultaneous suits by 
multiple parties raising the same or similar issues” would 
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“not only waste judicial resources, but could also result 
in inconsistent decisions.”  Otter Tail Power Co., 615 
F.3d at 1022; Romoland, 548 F.3d at 755.  More 
importantly, “allow[ing] plaintiffs to raise issues resolved 
during the permitting process long after that process is 
complete would upset the reasonable expectations of 
facility operators and undermine the significant 
investment of regulatory resources made by state 
permitting agencies.”  Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d at 
1022.  Nor does this exclusive review process prevent the 
EPA from correcting deficiencies in a permit application 
or from fixing an inadequate Title V permit.  If the 
application or proposed permit is deficient, the EPA must 
deny it or require supplemental information during the 
permitting process.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(1).  And 
the threat of criminal charges confronts any person who 
knowingly submits a deficient application.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 7413(c)(2)(A).  Even if the deficiencies are overlooked 
and remain undiscovered until after the permit is 
issued—as they allegedly were in this case—the proper 
avenue is for the EPA or states to reopen the permit to 
add any “applicable requirement” that was omitted 
during the permitting process.  40 C.F.R. § 70.7(f); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(e); 25 Pa. Code §§ 127.542, 
127.543. 
 Consequently, the District Court lacked 
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jurisdiction over the EPA’s Title V claims.24 
C. State-Law Claims 
 The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection and New York also appeal the dismissal of 
various state-law claims under the Pennsylvania Air 
Pollution and Control Act, Pennsylvania SIP, and 
common-law public nuisance.  They concede that these 
claims track the federal claims.  See Dist. Ct. Op., JA36; 
States Br. at 67.  And to the extent the state-law claims 
differ from the federal ones, the District Court found that 
“[t]hese claims were not thoroughly developed.”  Id.  We 
                                                 
24
 The EPA spars with the Current Owners over whether 
the Current Owners are insulated from liability by Title 
V’s safe-harbor provision.  Title V contains two permit 
shields—one that precludes Title V liability if an owner 
or operator “compli[es] with a permit issued in 
accordance with” Title V, and a second that insulates an 
owner or operator from liability for violating “other 
applicable provisions” of the Clean Air Act if it complies 
with a Title V permit that either expressly includes those 
provisions or states that they are inapplicable.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 7661c(f).  But these permit shields are merely 
sideshows.  Even assuming the EPA is correct that 
neither permit shield protects the Current Owners, the 
availability of this defense has no bearing on whether 
§ 7607 strips district courts of jurisdiction over collateral 
challenges to Title V permits.   
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will affirm their dismissal.  See Steagald v. United States, 
451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981) (holding that arguments not 
developed in district court are forfeited on appeal); In re 
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“A fleeting reference or vague allusion to an 
issue will not suffice to preserve it for appeal[.]”). 
III. 
 In an age when coal-burning power plants mingle 
with electric cars and when our scientific understanding 
of the planet grows at the same exponential rate that our 
natural resources deteriorate, protecting the environment 
is an almost-fearsome responsibility.  But when 
Congress’s statutory directives are at issue, that 
responsibility must yield to our duty to follow our 
coordinate branch’s commands.  Those commands could 
not be plainer here.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
order dismissing the EPA’s and States’ claims.
